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 In these comments I shall be mainly concerned with a selection of matters in Pinto's 
paper having to do with the relationship between premise truth and premise adequacy.  The 
matters I shall consider will not include the topic of evidential asymmetry.    
 Truth is not necessary for premise adequacy if falsity in a premise never prevents the 
premise from being adequate.  But this is not Pinto's view.  Rather, he thinks that there are 
certain cases in which false premises are adequate; if this is so, then truth is not necessary for 
premise adequacy. 
 But though Pinto denies that truth is necessary for premise adequacy, he concedes that in 
certain cases "falsity in a premiss is a fault or defect in that premiss".  The cases he has in mind 
are of the following sort: we have judged an argument to be good; later, we discover that the 
argument has a false premise, and this discovery causes us to reverse or qualify our earlier 
assessment of the argument; in such a case, Pinto holds, falsity in a premise is a fault or defect in 
that premise. 
 Here we might ask: when would (or, better, when should) discovering the falsity of a 
premise of an argument we had earlier judged to be good cause us to reverse or qualify our 
assessment of the argument?  Pinto doesn't say.  But remarks he makes later suggest he might 
say this: if the falsity of the premise significantly increases the risk that the conclusion is false, or 
cancels the probative force of the argument, then knowing this would (or should) cause us to 
reverse or qualify our earlier assessment of the argument. If Pinto would say this, he would also 
say, I take it, that falsity in a premise is a defect in that premise in either of these two cases, 
namely when it increases the risk that the conclusion is false, or when it cancels the probative 
force of the argument. 
 Does Pinto think that falsity in a premise is a defect only in cases where discovering to be 
false a premise of an argument we had earlier judged to be good would (or should) cause us to 
reverse or qualify our assessment of the argument?  We might think so, given that he says that 
falsity in a premise is a defect in that premise "in such cases", where "such" is emphasized.  But 
later Pinto presents an example of an inductive argument with many premises of which one or 
two inaccurately describe a few data points and are therefore false; Pinto says that the falsity of 
the one or two false premises "might well be considered a defect".  He adds, however, that in the 
case of the inductive argument in question, it is not a defect that significantly increases the risk 
that the conclusion is false or cancels the probative force of the argument.  Then I take it he 
would say that had we earlier judged the argument to be good and later discovered the falsity of 
the one or two false premises, this discovery would not (or should not) have caused us to reverse 
our earlier assessment of the argument.  Nevertheless, the falsity of the premises, he holds, might 
well be considered a defect.  If by this he means (as I believe he does) that the falsity of the one 
or two false premises might properly be considered a defect, we may ask why so.  Since the 
falsity of the false premises does not significantly increase the risk that the conclusion is false, or 
cancel the probative force of the argument, it is hard to see what the answer could be except that 
the falsity of the premises is inherently a defect in them.  But then falsity in a premise is always a 
defect.  And, indeed, that falsity in a premise is always a defect is suggested by Pinto's talk of 
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"tolerating premiss falsity" in certain cases (emphasis added).  But can Pinto say that falsity in a 
premise is always a defect consistently with what he says about the falsity of simplifying 
assumptions used as premises in an inductive argument?  He says that the falsity of the 
assumptions should not be considered "a defect in the reasoning" -- at least not in the sort of case 
he chooses to illustrate the use of simplifying assumptions.  If it is not a defect in the reasoning, 
does this means that it is not a defect in the assumptions, or in the premises, of the 
argument?  If so, then Pinto cannot consistently say that falsity in a premise is always a defect. 
As to whether he does think that falsity in a premise is always a defect, there is, I believe, 
conflicting evidence in his paper. But if he does think that falsity in a premise is always a defect, 
he must say that this defect need not prevent a premise from being adequate: he must say this, 
given that he holds that truth is not a necessary condition of premise adequacy.  If, on the other 
hand, he holds that falsity in a premise isn't always a defect, he is free to say that when it is a 
defect, it always makes the premise inadequate. 
 It would be Jim Freeman's view that falsity in a premise always makes the premise 
inadequate.   Pinto attributes to Freeman the following argument:  
F1) Our epistemic goal in accepting an argument or making an inference is the 
       acquisition of truth and the avoidance of falsehood. 
F2) We have no reason to believe that false premises lead reliably to true conclusions. 
Therefore, 
F3) Truth of premises is a desideratum in inferences or arguments - i.e., we ought to 
       prefer arguments with true premises to arguments with false premises.   
Pinto holds that in the case of arguments that are not deductively valid, "it is possible that 
some subclasses of such arguments having false premisses may have an equal or greater 
probability of having true conclusions than do 'non-deductive' arguments having only true 
premisses".  He gives two sorts of example, both of which I have already alluded to.  The first of 
them I will call the "simplifying assumptions" example.  Pinto says: "We often argue and reason 
from simplifying assumptions that we know to be false when we think that conclusions drawn 
from those assumptions have a high probability of being correct and when the simplifying 
assumptions will permit us to arrive at conclusions quickly and straightforwardly."  Now the 
probability of the conclusions drawn from the assumptions is, of course, conditional on the 
assumptions -- that is, on their assumed truth.  But, ex hypothesi, we know that they are false.  
Suppose we knew them to be not merely false but wildly inaccurate.  Then our confidence in the 
correctness of the conclusions drawn from them would be low.  If, however, we think that 
conclusions drawn from those assumptions have a high probability of being correct, even though 
we know the assumptions to be false, this can only be because we think that the assumptions are 
not wildly inaccurate, but are reasonably close approximations to the truth.  
 Pinto's second example compares two arguments that turn on inductive extrapolation of a 
relative frequency from a class of data points to a population. One of the arguments contains 
several thousand data points, of which all but one or two are accurately described.  It is in 
connection with this imagined argument that Pinto says that "falsity of one or two premises - 
inaccuracy in the description of a few data points - might well be considered a defect but it is not 
a defect that significantly increases the risk that the conclusion is false, and is not ... a defect that 
cancels the probative force of the argument". 
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 I believe that Pinto regards his two examples as counterexamples to the view that in the 
case of arguments that are not deductively valid, we ought (always) to prefer arguments with true 
premises to arguments with one or more false premises.  The examples are not directed against 
Freeman's (F2) -- the claim that we have no reason to believe that false premises lead reliably to 
true conclusions.  Nevertheless, I want to ask whether the examples refute (F2).  Let us take them 
in reverse order.  One of the arguments imagined in the second example has one or two false 
premises but many true premises, and its conclusion is highly probable on the premises.  Is this a 
case in which we have reason to believe that false premises lead reliably to a true conclusion -- 
or to a conclusion that is probably true?  I think not.  Rather, it is a case in which we have reason 
to believe that the premises will lead to a conclusion that is very probably true because the 
conclusion is highly probable on the premises, and because all but one or two of the argument's 
many premises are true, and because, as Pinto puts it in a footnote, the likelihood that the 
conclusion is true "barely changes if (a) we subtract the erroneous data or (b) we substitute 
correct data for the erroneous data." 
 Next the "simplifying assumptions" example.  Is a case of this sort one in which we have 
reason to believe that certain false premises will lead reliably to conclusions that have a high 
probability of being correct?  I think it is.  But the reason we have for believing this is that 
conclusions drawn from those premises are highly probable on those premises, and those 
premises, though false, are close approximations to the truth.  For all the example shows, we 
have no reason to believe that false premises as such lead reliably to true conclusions. 
 The "as such" qualifier is surely implicit in Freeman's (F2) -- the claim that we have no 
reason to believe that false premises lead reliably to true conclusions.  But then the claim is not 
refuted by Pinto's examples (not that he says otherwise). 
 Nevertheless, I find the first of those examples -- the "simplifying assumptions" example 
-- instructive in two ways, one of which relates to Pinto's criticism of a view I expressed in my 
1997 OSSA paper (Allen 1997).  There I said that a false proposition, p, has no tendency to show 
that a second proposition, q, is true.  Pinto challenges this view.  He holds that to show that a 
proposition, q, is true is to make it evident that q is true -- that is, it is to confer a certain 
epistemic status upon q. He further holds that for p to confer evidence upon q it is necessary not 
that p be true, but that p be reasonable to believe or accept.  Two comments.  First (and this Pinto 
would not deny), even if p is reasonable to believe or accept it may be false.  Second, it can be 
made evident that q is true only if q is true.  The thought I had in the paper to which Pinto is 
referring can be re-expressed as follows: it cannot be shown (that is, made evident) on the basis 
of a false proposition, p, that another proposition, q, is true. Or, to put it yet differently, if I argue 
"p, therefore q", and q is false, it cannot be the case that I thereby show (i.e., make evident) that q 
is true.  Pinto does not refute this view in the section of his paper in which he comments directly 
on my 1997 OSSA paper. But he does persuade me by means of his "simplifying assumptions" 
example that in the case of "non-deductive" arguments it can be shown on the basis of false 
propositions that a further proposition is probably true -- but, I think, only if the false 
propositions are close approximations to the truth. This is one of the two ways in which I find 
that example instructive.  The other can be stated more briefly: the example persuades me that 
truth is not after all necessary for premise adequacy; it does not persuade me, however, that a 
false premise can be adequate if it is not at least a close approximation to the truth. 
 But what about the "inductive extrapolation" example, in which one of the arguments has 
one or two false premises that for all we are told are not close approximations to the truth but 
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may be highly inaccurate? Does Pinto think that those premises, despite being false, are adequate 
-- that it is rational to accept them?  He does not say, and I will not pursue the matter.  Instead I 
will turn to remarks he makes at the end of his discussion of the argument of Freeman's that I 
stated above. 
 Pinto says that this argument "does bring into play the importance of considering the 
effect of tolerating premiss falsity when our goal is [to] encourage arguments whose conclusions 
are true.  At this point it seems likely that we should want a criterion of premiss adequacy that 
tolerates false premisses in certain cases, but on the whole renders a negative verdict in the case 
of premisses that are false.  But notice that making rational acceptance our criterion of premiss 
adequacy might well achieve this - if indeed premisses which it is reasonable to believe are for 
the most part true."  I want to consider these remarks carefully. 
 First, note that here Pinto apparently equates rational acceptance with reasonable belief.  
But in a footnote to his "simplifying assumptions" example, he says that he is "now inclined to 
think that the criterion of premiss adequacy ought not to be formulated in terms of reasonable 
belief but in terms of reasonable acceptance - and in particular should turn on whether a premiss 
is reasonable to accept as a basis of reasoning in a particular context."  But then when Pinto says 
that, on a certain condition, making rational acceptance our criterion of premise adequacy might 
well achieve a criterion of premise adequacy that tolerates false premises in certain cases but on 
the whole renders a negative verdict on premises that are false, surely he ought to have 
formulated that condition not in terms of reasonable belief but in terms of reasonable acceptance.  
He might then have said this: making rational acceptance our criterion of premise adequacy 
might well give us a criterion of premise adequacy that tolerates false premises in certain cases 
but on the whole renders a negative verdict on premises that are false -- if (and here is the 
reformulated condition) it isn't reasonable, other things being equal, to accept false premises as a 
basis of reasoning at least when our goals are to accept arguments whose conclusions are true 
and not accept arguments whose conclusions are false. Three comments on this condition. (1) If 
what it says is true, then, given the "other things being equal" qualifier in the condition, a 
rational-acceptance criterion of premise adequacy will tolerate false premises in certain cases.  
(2) If what the condition says is true, then in general it isn't reasonable to accept false premises 
as a basis of reasoning when our goals are to accept arguments whose conclusions are true and 
not accept arguments whose conclusions are false, and so a rational-acceptance criterion of 
premise adequacy will on the whole render a negative verdict on premises that are false.   
(3) The condition refers to the goals of accepting arguments whose conclusions are true and not 
accepting arguments whose conclusions are false.  I formulated the condition in terms of these 
goals because in a footnote Pinto says: "'two prominent contexts in which criteria of good 
argument will be employed are (1) the management of our individual and collective cognitive 
affairs and (2) the teaching of such things as critical thinking and reasoning skills.  Among the 
most prominent goals operative in such contexts are the acceptance of arguments whose 
conclusions are true and the avoidance of arguments whose conclusions are false." 
 Next, suppose that we want a criterion of premise adequacy that on the whole renders a 
negative verdict on false premises.  Then we must think that in general false premises are not 
adequate.  But then we will think that when we test a premise for adequacy, part of what we must 
do is test it for truth or falsity.  There are two scenarios to consider here. Scenario 1: We test the 
premise for truth or falsity.  If we find the premise is false, we ask whether it nevertheless 
satisfies our criterion of premise adequacy.  If our criterion of premise adequacy on the whole 
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renders a negative verdict on false premises, then, if the case is typical, the premise, being false, 
will not satisfy our criterion. Scenario 2: To appraise the premise by our criterion of premise 
adequacy is, in part, to test it for truth or falsity.  If we find the premise is false, and if our 
criterion on the whole renders a negative verdict on false premises, then, if the case is typical, the 
premise will not satisfy our criterion. 
 If then our criterion of premise adequacy is rational acceptance, then on Scenario 1 it 
must be supplemented by a truth test, while on Scenario 2 an appraisal of a premise by that 
criterion will in part be a truth test.  In either case, if we make rational acceptance our criterion 
for premise adequacy, we must still test premises for truth or falsity if we want our criterion on 
the whole to render a negative verdict on false premises. 
 A rational-acceptance criterion of premise adequacy might well render a negative verdict 
on false premises in typical cases, while tolerating false premises in certain cases, if (to repeat 
my reformulation of Pinto's condition) it isn't reasonable, other things being equal, to accept false 
premises as a basis of reasoning when our goals are to accept arguments whose conclusions are 
true and avoid arguments whose conclusions are false. But is it true that when we have these 
goals it isn't reasonable, other things being equal, to accept false premises as a basis of 
reasoning?  An argument is needed here.  And a premise of the argument (not, to be sure, the 
only premise, but a premise) might be Freeman's (F2) -- the claim that we have no reason to 
believe that false premises (i.e., false premises as such) lead to true conclusions.  This claim, I 
have argued, is not refuted (nor does Pinto say it is) by Pinto's "simplifying assumptions" 
example or by his "inductive extrapolation" example.  And Pinto might wish to avail himself of 
it in defense of the view that it isn't reasonable, other things being equal, to accept false premises 
as a basis of reasoning when we want to accept arguments whose conclusions are true and not 
accept arguments whose conclusions are false.  Equally, and relatedly, he might wish to avail 
himself of (F2) to defend his view that when our goal is to encourage arguments whose 
conclusions are true, it seems likely we should want a criterion of premise adequacy that on the 
whole renders a negative verdict on false premises. 
 To conclude.  The issue Pinto investigates in his paper is whether acceptability is a 
sufficient condition of premise adequacy, or whether truth must be recognized as an additional 
requirement that a premise must meet in order to be adequate.  Truth fails to be an additional 
requirement of premise adequacy if it is not a requirement of premise adequacy or if it is a 
requirement of premise adequacy but is not a requirement additional to acceptability because (as 
a proponent of this view would hold) acceptability requires truth.  Pinto holds that truth is not a 
requirement of premise adequacy, hence that it is not a requirement additional to acceptability.  I 
think he is right that truth is not a requirement of premise adequacy, and that his "simplifying 
assumptions" example makes this evident.  But I also think that for all Pinto's discussion shows, 
the following two propositions may both be true: 
1) Other things being equal, in a context of argument appraisal in which our goals 
are to encourage or accept arguments whose conclusions are true, and not 
encourage or accept arguments whose conclusions are false, a premise is 
adequate only if it is true. 
2) In such a context, a false premise may be adequate, but only if it is a close 
approximation to the truth. 
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 As to whether acceptability is a sufficient condition of premise adequacy, I do not think 
that Pinto has yet shown that it is.  Not because he has not shown that truth is not a requirement 
of premise adequacy (I think he has) but because he has not spelled out (indeed in his paper he 
says he will not there try to spell out) what acceptability is.  Nor (and this would be a task that 
would presuppose some account of what acceptability is) has he provided protocols for deciding 
when a premise (in particular a false premise) is reasonable to accept as a basis of reasoning in a 
particular context.  But of course he doesn't claim that his discussion of the issue he considers in 
his paper is final; rather, he says that he doesn't think it is.  
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